What a difference 2246 miles makes

The no-byline approach of The Economist has the effect of presenting all the various viewpoints put forward by its writers as the voice of a single, all-wise hive mind. On occasion, though, the splits become more obvious, as with this week’s two pieces on the likely victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian elections. A leader, likely written in London, argues:

Are the sceptics who said that Arabs could not handle democracy—and would inevitably elect nasty people who would never surrender power—being proved horribly right?

The answer is no. Until the Brothers actually take power, it is hard to say with certainty where the dominant mainstream of political Islam stands. But most of the signs are that it is a long way from both its intolerant caricature and the tenets promoted by some of the Brothers’ predecessors a generation ago. Indeed, the most striking feature of the Arab spring remains the complete failure of violently radical Islam. Al-Qaeda, the murderous perversion of Islam responsible for felling the Twin Towers and for countless other atrocities against Muslims as well as Christians and Jews, has entirely failed to make its presence felt. As peaceful political Islam advances, al-Qaeda and its violent jihadi friends have retreated to the remotest patches of Yemen, Somalia and the Sahara desert.

The piece acknowledges the risk that the Brotherhood could team up with the Salafists, the conservative Islamist – but not jihadist – party that seems set to come second.

That would be small comfort for liberal Egyptians if the Brotherhood teamed up with the Salafists and then claimed a democratic right to expunge secularists from government—and from most of Egypt’s institutions. But that does not seem likely. The Brothers have repeatedly insisted that they will uphold the rights of women and religious minorities and respect the verdict of the polls, even if it goes against them. They say they will not enforce the veil or immediately ban alcohol. As in Tunisia and Morocco, they will seek to rule in coalition with secularists. As in Turkey, they want the generals who used to rule and persecute them to go back to their barracks. They will be keener to support the Palestinians than Hosni Mubarak was, but do not want to tear up the peace treaty with Israel.

Cheering stuff. But now look at this piece, from the same edition, but filed from Jerusalem, assessing the Israeli reaction to the Egyptian result.

Even if Egypt’s Islamists refrain from scrapping the peace treaty, Israel fears they will seek to amend the clauses that provide for Sinai’s demilitarisation. They might even put the treaty to a referendum. The Salafists, though declaring themselves non-violent at present, could yet—Israelis fear—turn jihadist…

If the Islamists end up ruling Egypt, might they seek to engage with Israel? Precedent is not encouraging. When Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006 and then asserted sole control over Gaza the following year, Israel opted for boycott and siege unless Hamas recognised Israel, among other things. After President Hosni Mubarak’s fall in February, Israeli diplomats in Cairo suggested making overtures to the Muslim Brotherhood, only to be told from on high to desist.

See how evidence of Israeli resistance to Hamas and the Brotherhood – the former is described in the same article, oversimplistically, as the latter’s ‘Palestinian branch’ – is presented as evidence of the Brotherhood’s resistance towards peace with Israel? The Economist’s Jerusalem correspondent may have gone a little native. My suspicion is that the perspective of the first, more optimistic piece is closer to the truth. If not, Israel can take heart in the knowledge that Egypt’s generals seem not much closer to allowing proper civilian government anyway.

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